<![CDATA[Rotorway Forums - Mechanical Failures and Accidents]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/ Sun, 18 Oct 2026 11:42:01 +0000 MyBB <![CDATA[hose clamp failure]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-235.html Fri, 04 Sep 2026 06:18:22 -0500 Graeme Smith]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-235.html [Image: 20260904-124513.jpg]

[Image: 20260904-180324.jpg]]]> [Image: 20260904-124513.jpg]

[Image: 20260904-180324.jpg]]]> <![CDATA[How safe are experimental helicopters?]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-203.html Tue, 18 Aug 2026 13:39:37 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-203.html  
A query of the NTSB accident database certainly would support that fact that accidents happen to all kinds of aircraft, both fixed and rotary wing machines. Are cars and motorcycles safe? Lets take it back further before the age of the internal combustion engine we could ask if horses are a safe way to get to point a to b. Many people are injured every year by horses.
 
In truth the human body is fragile and nearly anything we do has an element of risk. When I was 31 years old I had pretty much made it financially. I was in the process of installing the first wind farm in the windy hills of southern Solano County in California and president of a large wind farm company. I also owned a hot tub, spa, and solar store in Suisun California, numerous apartments and rental properties, and thought that I had it made for life. At 10pm on June 6, 1982, as I was leaving my office and driving home to my new custom home, an oncoming vehicle swerved into my path and struck my truck head-on.
 
I woke up on October 1 of 1984 pennyless and homeless. The head injury that I sustained in the head-on collision with the drunk teen-aged driver had caused my brain to be unable of recording memory for nearly two and a half years, during which time my business and investments evaporated. It was a long road to recovery but by the late 1980’s I was back in business and financially able to start shopping for my first Rotorway helicopter.
 
Since then I have accumulated over 15,000 hours in helicopters, (of those hours over 13,000 have been in Rotorway helicopters of varying models) and have piloted my own airplanes for over 2000 hours. During those over 16,000 hours of PIC time I have never been injured one time when a Safari main rotor blade de-laminated during takeoff. The only other “crash” that I have had was when, as a green pilot on a high density altitude day at max gross wt., I lost main rotor rpm on lift off and entered an LTE spin. I took out the tail rotor on my own ship as I set it down. That was an easy fix and within a week I was flying again.

The below photo is of the Rotorway that had Safari main rotor blades installed and when the one blade delaminated it flipped us up side down causing the helicopter to initially land on the top of the rotor hub and then fall over onto its side.


[Image: IMG-4786.jpg]

The below photo shows the sod stuck in the top of the rotor system from the initial ground contact.



[Image: IMG-4860.jpg]

 
Based solely upon my own personal experience, I could conclude that driving a vehicle on the roads exposed me to more risk than flying helicopters and airplanes. I had always thought that flying a medevac helicopter would be exciting and rewarding. In 2005 I was approached my Air Evac Lifeteam recruiters to become a medivac helicopter pilot flying the Bell 206 Longranger. I committed to fly for one year so in 2006 I divided my time between Rotorway instruction and medevac helicopter flights.
 
There were many times when the circumstances would put the helicopter and crew on the edge of any safety margins. I came closer to unseen wires at night while approaching or departing remote emergency scenes than I had ever flying Rotorway helicopters. I experienced wind sheer while departing from the 17[sup]th[/sup] story roof top of a hospital as the 30 kt winds whipped around the elevator enclosure near the helipads. I even had a construction crane swing its boom directly into the path of the helicopter when I was on final approach to the hospital rooftop helipad.

On one flight I was sprayed with a patient’s blood in-flight and it was of such a volume that it was running down the inside of the wind screen and covering my instruments and my uniform. During that year of flying medevac helicopters I was exposed to more risk than during any other period of my flying career.
 
Already this year there have been a number of medevac helicopter crashes, I can think of 4 off the top of my head, in which the pilots, crews, and patients were all killed. From my own experience I would have to conclude that medevac helicopter flying is the most risky flying that one can engage in.
 
Now let’s go back to the original question, “Is the Rotorway helicopter safe to fly?” Based upon my own experience I would have to conclude emphatically, “yes it is”.  During my years of involvement with this great little helicopter I have experienced a number of failures caused by either poor design or poor workmanship.
 
The Rotorway helicopter has slowly evolved from a very basic one person underpowered hard to control ship to a reliable two place helicopter over its production history. There were many issues with the prior models that I have discussed in articles and on my web site accessed by the green button at the top of this page, many of which have been  addressed on the new Talon that Rotorway is now producing.

The fuel tank outlet fittings for the Talon are now incorporating the internal washer that I designed and offered to all builders over 15 years ago. The Fatal flaw in the overhead wiring (it is simple to fix if you have this model) of the 162F has been eliminated by the total redesign of the wiring system on the last year of the Talon.
 
At the time of this writing there have been over 20 fatalities involving medevac helicopters flown by highly trained and highly experienced commercial pilots this year alone. As I look back at my involvement with experimental helicopters I have personal knowledge of only 5 fatalities involving these helicopters.]]>  
A query of the NTSB accident database certainly would support that fact that accidents happen to all kinds of aircraft, both fixed and rotary wing machines. Are cars and motorcycles safe? Lets take it back further before the age of the internal combustion engine we could ask if horses are a safe way to get to point a to b. Many people are injured every year by horses.
 
In truth the human body is fragile and nearly anything we do has an element of risk. When I was 31 years old I had pretty much made it financially. I was in the process of installing the first wind farm in the windy hills of southern Solano County in California and president of a large wind farm company. I also owned a hot tub, spa, and solar store in Suisun California, numerous apartments and rental properties, and thought that I had it made for life. At 10pm on June 6, 1982, as I was leaving my office and driving home to my new custom home, an oncoming vehicle swerved into my path and struck my truck head-on.
 
I woke up on October 1 of 1984 pennyless and homeless. The head injury that I sustained in the head-on collision with the drunk teen-aged driver had caused my brain to be unable of recording memory for nearly two and a half years, during which time my business and investments evaporated. It was a long road to recovery but by the late 1980’s I was back in business and financially able to start shopping for my first Rotorway helicopter.
 
Since then I have accumulated over 15,000 hours in helicopters, (of those hours over 13,000 have been in Rotorway helicopters of varying models) and have piloted my own airplanes for over 2000 hours. During those over 16,000 hours of PIC time I have never been injured one time when a Safari main rotor blade de-laminated during takeoff. The only other “crash” that I have had was when, as a green pilot on a high density altitude day at max gross wt., I lost main rotor rpm on lift off and entered an LTE spin. I took out the tail rotor on my own ship as I set it down. That was an easy fix and within a week I was flying again.

The below photo is of the Rotorway that had Safari main rotor blades installed and when the one blade delaminated it flipped us up side down causing the helicopter to initially land on the top of the rotor hub and then fall over onto its side.


[Image: IMG-4786.jpg]

The below photo shows the sod stuck in the top of the rotor system from the initial ground contact.



[Image: IMG-4860.jpg]

 
Based solely upon my own personal experience, I could conclude that driving a vehicle on the roads exposed me to more risk than flying helicopters and airplanes. I had always thought that flying a medevac helicopter would be exciting and rewarding. In 2005 I was approached my Air Evac Lifeteam recruiters to become a medivac helicopter pilot flying the Bell 206 Longranger. I committed to fly for one year so in 2006 I divided my time between Rotorway instruction and medevac helicopter flights.
 
There were many times when the circumstances would put the helicopter and crew on the edge of any safety margins. I came closer to unseen wires at night while approaching or departing remote emergency scenes than I had ever flying Rotorway helicopters. I experienced wind sheer while departing from the 17[sup]th[/sup] story roof top of a hospital as the 30 kt winds whipped around the elevator enclosure near the helipads. I even had a construction crane swing its boom directly into the path of the helicopter when I was on final approach to the hospital rooftop helipad.

On one flight I was sprayed with a patient’s blood in-flight and it was of such a volume that it was running down the inside of the wind screen and covering my instruments and my uniform. During that year of flying medevac helicopters I was exposed to more risk than during any other period of my flying career.
 
Already this year there have been a number of medevac helicopter crashes, I can think of 4 off the top of my head, in which the pilots, crews, and patients were all killed. From my own experience I would have to conclude that medevac helicopter flying is the most risky flying that one can engage in.
 
Now let’s go back to the original question, “Is the Rotorway helicopter safe to fly?” Based upon my own experience I would have to conclude emphatically, “yes it is”.  During my years of involvement with this great little helicopter I have experienced a number of failures caused by either poor design or poor workmanship.
 
The Rotorway helicopter has slowly evolved from a very basic one person underpowered hard to control ship to a reliable two place helicopter over its production history. There were many issues with the prior models that I have discussed in articles and on my web site accessed by the green button at the top of this page, many of which have been  addressed on the new Talon that Rotorway is now producing.

The fuel tank outlet fittings for the Talon are now incorporating the internal washer that I designed and offered to all builders over 15 years ago. The Fatal flaw in the overhead wiring (it is simple to fix if you have this model) of the 162F has been eliminated by the total redesign of the wiring system on the last year of the Talon.
 
At the time of this writing there have been over 20 fatalities involving medevac helicopters flown by highly trained and highly experienced commercial pilots this year alone. As I look back at my involvement with experimental helicopters I have personal knowledge of only 5 fatalities involving these helicopters.]]> <![CDATA[Anatomy of a Rotorway crash]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-184.html Fri, 14 Aug 2026 10:42:27 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-184.html
Over the next several days I was able to gather bits and pieces of information that filled in some of the blanks in the train of events that led to the accident. There was one witness who heard the helicopter fly over, and then saw it drop vertically from the sky. The helicopter’s vertical stabilizer was found some distance from the wreckage along the helicopter’s flight path. Speculation at first was that the departure of the vertical stabilizer had caused a condition in which the pilot was unable to control the helicopter. It was thought that due to a forward shift of the helicopter’s center of gravity the nose had pitched forward and that it had crashed as a result. It is possible that this may have been a factor in the crash case but other evidence points to another possibility.
It was reported that the helicopter was seen falling vertically without the blades turning. The crash site photos showed an impact crater that looked to be over a foot deep in the soft ground where the helicopter landed. Other photos indicate that neither the main rotors or the tail rotors were turning at the time of ground impact. All of this would indicate the probability that the helicopter had experienced a condition known as Rotor Stall. This aerodynamic phenomenon occurs when the speed of the main rotors declines to the point that the aerodynamic drag on the main rotor blades becomes greater than the engine’s ability to keep them turning with the result being a rapid increase of drag on the rotors leading to their stoppage.

It is needless to say that once the main rotors of a helicopter stop, they can no longer produce lift and the helicopter will from the sky. This scenario appears to be what may have happened in the case we are discussing. One can assume that prior to the vertical stabilizer departing the helicopter it would have made some unusual noise, vibration, or both that alerted the pilot that something was wrong. I always teach my helicopter students “If in doubt, auto out”. This means that if something occurs out of the ordinary; an unexpected noise, an unusual smell, or maybe just a feeling that something is wrong, the first action that the pilot should take is to enter an autorotation, pick an appropriate landing spot, and then if time permits on the way down the pilot can try to determine the cause of the unusual event.

There is one indisputable fact that every helicopter pilot must be aware of and must practice at all times, maintain main rotor RPM. The first law of helicopter flying is “Those who loose rotor RPM will surely die”. It is not a pleasant thought but it is an aerodynamic reality. No matter what happens while piloting a helicopter, it is the pilot’s foremost responsibility to maintain the main rotor rpm within the range prescribed by the manufacturer.
It is likely that my former student became aware of the problem of the vertical stabilizer becoming detached from the tail boom and became distracted by trying to determine the cause of the unusual indications that he was getting. When flying a helicopter without an engine governor, it would be easy to fixate on a problem and to not pay attention to the one indicator that must be maintained at all times, the main rotor RPM needle. The main rotors of a helicopter will stall at some point where the RPM drops below the RPM indicated by the redline on the rotor RPM gauge.

Mark, Jim’s son-in-law asked me to get the word out to the experimental helicopter community on the possible causes of this tragic accident in the hopes that others may not find themselves in the same situation. The Vertical Stabilizer separated due to the builder drilling two holes in the attachment bracket instead of the one hole that is called for in the plans. One of the holes had a sharp nick on it where a crack began and propagated along the bracket until it broke, allowing the stabilizer to depart the ship. See the photo below of the offending bracket.
[Image: VstabBraket2.jpg]
[font][font]It is very important to check the integrity of the stabilizer bracket before every flight. [/font][/font]
Back in January I received a phone call from the hospital room of another former student of mine. When I first talked with Jim Dorman he had told me that his dream was to fly as a medevac helicopter pilot. I suggested that he gain the required 1500 hours in an experimental helicopter and to then get his instrument ticket in a certified machine. Following our flight instruction sessions, Jim had accumulated over 1400 hours in his Rotorway 162F helicopter. He was having the time of his life flying all over the Kansas City, Kansas area with his wife Mia navigating from the passenger seat. Many of Jim’s flights were with his hangar mate Don (another former student) who flew his own Rotorway 162F.
[Image: Inflight.jpg]
Jim kept his Rotorway well maintained and flew it at every opportunity. As with all of my students I instructed Jim and Don to check and verify the tension on the tail rotor drive belt in two locations prior to every flight. First a simple squeeze test is performed by reaching up between the frame members at the first tail boom bulkhead. The belt is squeezed and the pilot determines if the belts are tight or loose by the tension felt. The pilot then verifies his findings by using the belt tension tool to check the tension of the rear drive belt. If the belt pulley swing arms are free to move as they are designed the two tension tests will verify one another. If there is a discrepancy in the two tension measurements, the pilot investigates to determine the reason for the discrepancy.
This is a very simple but important check that should be performed prior to each flight. The process is quite simple and fast if the rear body panels are removed. If a belt tension adjustment is indicated the aft tail boom covers must be removed to allow access to the tension adjustment mechanism. The Rotorway helicopters look much better when they are flown with all of their covers and body panels in place. Once they are all in place it takes time to remove them to make the tension checks and adjustments. I always leave these panels off the helicopters when I am instructing a student so that we have easy access to make inspections and adjustments prior to every flight.
Jim and Mia departed from their home airport and flew to New Century airport in Eastern Kansas where they joined up with Don Eikel. Together they flew their two helicopters to the Paola Kansas airport to have lunch at the on-field restaurant. Jim had all of the helicopter inspection covers and panels installed. He used his belt tension tool to check the tail rotor belt tension prior to boarding his helicopter. He noted that the belt tension was on the loose side of the range but still within the factory specified range where it had been for the past 100 hours. Jim recalled that I had instructed him to never run the belts on the loose side of the middle mark but the factory instructions indicated that running the belts in that range was acceptable.
Jim had secured a hangar at a different airport so when they got close to home Jim and Don went their separate ways. The area over which he was flying had plenty of open areas interspersed with patches of dense forest. (Another important technique that I instruct my students to follow is to avoid over flying anything that they do not want to land in. Altitude is our friend and with sufficient altitude we can usually keep our helicopters within autorotation range of suitable emergency landing areas.)
Jim decided to cut across a densely forested area to expedite the trip home. About midway across this patch of forest Jim heard and felt several bangs behind him followed by a left yaw of the nose. He immediately entered an autorotation and looked for a suitable opening in the forest in which to land the helicopter. As he rapidly scanned the area ahead and to the sides there it became apparent that he had only one option, he was going to be forced to flare his beloved helicopter into the tops of the trees and hope for the best.
Jim headed for an area where the canopy looked a bit less dense. He remembered the first rule of helicopter survival: “maintain rotor RPM” and the second rule “always fly the helicopter”. By immediately entering and maintaining an autorotation Jim was able to maintain main rotor RPM in the proper range. Even though his landing options were next to non-existent Jim continued to “fly the helicopter” by maintaining airspeed to allow for the all-important flare that he knew he would need to execute to slow the helicopter as he descended into the forest canopy.
As the tree tops rushed up to meet them, Jim told Mia to hold on as he executed a perfect flare just above the tree tops. He said that he continued to fly the helicopter as it fell through the tree branches chopping wood all the way down. The ride down felt like slow motion to both Jim and Mia. At some point during the crashing, chopping, ripping and twisting ride through the oak tree canopy the helicopter rolled onto it’s left side and impacted the ground as Jim continued to manipulate the controls. Jim and Mia were alive!
[Image: skidsup.jpg]
As they lay on the ground inside the battered fuselage fuel began pouring from the fuel sender fitting (due to the weak attaching method Rotorway uses for attaching the fuel sender. If you are flying a Rotorway, now is a good time to modify this attachment with rivets or nut plates installed on the inside of the tank flange). Jim yelled for Mia to get out fearing that the helicopter would burst into flames. Before he unbuckled his seat belt he flipped off all of the electrical switches and turned the fuel valve to the off position. He then unbuckled the seat belt and fell to the ground on his back but could not exit the helicopter because his left leg was pinned between the instrument console and a large tree branch. The impact of the crash snapped the pilot cyclic control and it was also wedged against his leg. Mia scrambled out of the wreckage and tried to free Jim’s trapped leg before the gushing fuel might be ignited by the hot engine. It was no use, his left leg had sustained double compound fractures with the bones sticking out of his pant leg and the lower part of his leg was held fast between the instrument panel and the tree.
The couple joined forces and with his right leg Jim pushed up with all of his might on the instrument panel and Mia lifted the nose of the helicopter with all the strength that she had. The wreckage shifted just enough that Jim was able to grab his leg with both hands slide it free. The leg flopped onto the ground with both leg bones protruding from his torn flesh and ripped pant leg. With Mia’s help he was able to semi crab crawl away from the ship.
It was immediately obvious that Jim needed immediate medical attention. Since Mia had sustained only a few minor scratches in the accident and because the fuel had not ignited Jim asked her if she still had her camera, she did. He asked her to start taking pictures and those are the photos that you are viewing in this article.
As he lay on the ground he looked around and noticed that laying right next to him were two branches that had been chopped off by the main rotors and a roll of electrical tape that had been in the floor storage compartment. Grabbing the branches and the tape he fashioned a splint to immobilize his leg and then crawled as far as he could from the wreckage. Another miracle was that lying right next to the roll of tape on the ground was Jim’s cell phone. Mia was able to use the phone to call 911 and rescue services were mobilized. The phone had GPS capability that enabled the 911 operator to pinpoint the location of the crash.
Soon rescue vehicles could be heard in the distance and a helicopter seen overhead but the emergency services could not spot the wreckage due to the dense tree canopy. Mia hiked through the dense brush to an clearing where she was able to flag down the rescue service personnel and lead them to her injured husband. He was stabilized and carried to the waiting medevac helicopter that had landed in a nearby clearing and then transported to the Kansas University Hospital.
[Image: Jim7.jpg]
Jim has made a full recovery from his accident and is now flying for Air Evac as a medevac helicopter pilot.
Jim asked me to print this quote from him “If it wasn’t for Orv’s autorotation training, it would not have turned out as well as it did. Orv taught me to always fly the helicopter all the way to the ground. I few it to the trees, through the trees and was still on the controls when I was upside down on the ground. I stopped piloting when it stopped moving. Orv and I must have done 100 or more autos in my Rotorway and it was just natural to immediately enter an auto when I knew we were in trouble”.
[Image: Jim6.jpg]
Mia added “ Having Orv come to our home to give Jimmy his flight instruction and auto training was the best money we ever spent. The training that Orv gave Jim saved our lives. That is why we invited Orv & Sheila to celebrate our 25th anniversary with us on an Alaska cruise.”
We had a great Alaskan cruise with Jim and Mia this past June. Jim is now in the process of rebuilding his bent Rotorway and plans on having it flying by the spring of 2008. If you remember anything from these stories it should be: 1. Always maintain main rotor rpm while in flight, and 2. If in doubt, AUTO OUT!!.
Jim is now the lead pilot of the Poplar Bluff Missouri Air Evac helicopter air ambulance company. In spite of this set-back, Jim's little Rotorway made his dream of flying medevac helicopters become a reality.]]>
Over the next several days I was able to gather bits and pieces of information that filled in some of the blanks in the train of events that led to the accident. There was one witness who heard the helicopter fly over, and then saw it drop vertically from the sky. The helicopter’s vertical stabilizer was found some distance from the wreckage along the helicopter’s flight path. Speculation at first was that the departure of the vertical stabilizer had caused a condition in which the pilot was unable to control the helicopter. It was thought that due to a forward shift of the helicopter’s center of gravity the nose had pitched forward and that it had crashed as a result. It is possible that this may have been a factor in the crash case but other evidence points to another possibility.
It was reported that the helicopter was seen falling vertically without the blades turning. The crash site photos showed an impact crater that looked to be over a foot deep in the soft ground where the helicopter landed. Other photos indicate that neither the main rotors or the tail rotors were turning at the time of ground impact. All of this would indicate the probability that the helicopter had experienced a condition known as Rotor Stall. This aerodynamic phenomenon occurs when the speed of the main rotors declines to the point that the aerodynamic drag on the main rotor blades becomes greater than the engine’s ability to keep them turning with the result being a rapid increase of drag on the rotors leading to their stoppage.

It is needless to say that once the main rotors of a helicopter stop, they can no longer produce lift and the helicopter will from the sky. This scenario appears to be what may have happened in the case we are discussing. One can assume that prior to the vertical stabilizer departing the helicopter it would have made some unusual noise, vibration, or both that alerted the pilot that something was wrong. I always teach my helicopter students “If in doubt, auto out”. This means that if something occurs out of the ordinary; an unexpected noise, an unusual smell, or maybe just a feeling that something is wrong, the first action that the pilot should take is to enter an autorotation, pick an appropriate landing spot, and then if time permits on the way down the pilot can try to determine the cause of the unusual event.

There is one indisputable fact that every helicopter pilot must be aware of and must practice at all times, maintain main rotor RPM. The first law of helicopter flying is “Those who loose rotor RPM will surely die”. It is not a pleasant thought but it is an aerodynamic reality. No matter what happens while piloting a helicopter, it is the pilot’s foremost responsibility to maintain the main rotor rpm within the range prescribed by the manufacturer.
It is likely that my former student became aware of the problem of the vertical stabilizer becoming detached from the tail boom and became distracted by trying to determine the cause of the unusual indications that he was getting. When flying a helicopter without an engine governor, it would be easy to fixate on a problem and to not pay attention to the one indicator that must be maintained at all times, the main rotor RPM needle. The main rotors of a helicopter will stall at some point where the RPM drops below the RPM indicated by the redline on the rotor RPM gauge.

Mark, Jim’s son-in-law asked me to get the word out to the experimental helicopter community on the possible causes of this tragic accident in the hopes that others may not find themselves in the same situation. The Vertical Stabilizer separated due to the builder drilling two holes in the attachment bracket instead of the one hole that is called for in the plans. One of the holes had a sharp nick on it where a crack began and propagated along the bracket until it broke, allowing the stabilizer to depart the ship. See the photo below of the offending bracket.
[Image: VstabBraket2.jpg]
[font][font]It is very important to check the integrity of the stabilizer bracket before every flight. [/font][/font]
Back in January I received a phone call from the hospital room of another former student of mine. When I first talked with Jim Dorman he had told me that his dream was to fly as a medevac helicopter pilot. I suggested that he gain the required 1500 hours in an experimental helicopter and to then get his instrument ticket in a certified machine. Following our flight instruction sessions, Jim had accumulated over 1400 hours in his Rotorway 162F helicopter. He was having the time of his life flying all over the Kansas City, Kansas area with his wife Mia navigating from the passenger seat. Many of Jim’s flights were with his hangar mate Don (another former student) who flew his own Rotorway 162F.
[Image: Inflight.jpg]
Jim kept his Rotorway well maintained and flew it at every opportunity. As with all of my students I instructed Jim and Don to check and verify the tension on the tail rotor drive belt in two locations prior to every flight. First a simple squeeze test is performed by reaching up between the frame members at the first tail boom bulkhead. The belt is squeezed and the pilot determines if the belts are tight or loose by the tension felt. The pilot then verifies his findings by using the belt tension tool to check the tension of the rear drive belt. If the belt pulley swing arms are free to move as they are designed the two tension tests will verify one another. If there is a discrepancy in the two tension measurements, the pilot investigates to determine the reason for the discrepancy.
This is a very simple but important check that should be performed prior to each flight. The process is quite simple and fast if the rear body panels are removed. If a belt tension adjustment is indicated the aft tail boom covers must be removed to allow access to the tension adjustment mechanism. The Rotorway helicopters look much better when they are flown with all of their covers and body panels in place. Once they are all in place it takes time to remove them to make the tension checks and adjustments. I always leave these panels off the helicopters when I am instructing a student so that we have easy access to make inspections and adjustments prior to every flight.
Jim and Mia departed from their home airport and flew to New Century airport in Eastern Kansas where they joined up with Don Eikel. Together they flew their two helicopters to the Paola Kansas airport to have lunch at the on-field restaurant. Jim had all of the helicopter inspection covers and panels installed. He used his belt tension tool to check the tail rotor belt tension prior to boarding his helicopter. He noted that the belt tension was on the loose side of the range but still within the factory specified range where it had been for the past 100 hours. Jim recalled that I had instructed him to never run the belts on the loose side of the middle mark but the factory instructions indicated that running the belts in that range was acceptable.
Jim had secured a hangar at a different airport so when they got close to home Jim and Don went their separate ways. The area over which he was flying had plenty of open areas interspersed with patches of dense forest. (Another important technique that I instruct my students to follow is to avoid over flying anything that they do not want to land in. Altitude is our friend and with sufficient altitude we can usually keep our helicopters within autorotation range of suitable emergency landing areas.)
Jim decided to cut across a densely forested area to expedite the trip home. About midway across this patch of forest Jim heard and felt several bangs behind him followed by a left yaw of the nose. He immediately entered an autorotation and looked for a suitable opening in the forest in which to land the helicopter. As he rapidly scanned the area ahead and to the sides there it became apparent that he had only one option, he was going to be forced to flare his beloved helicopter into the tops of the trees and hope for the best.
Jim headed for an area where the canopy looked a bit less dense. He remembered the first rule of helicopter survival: “maintain rotor RPM” and the second rule “always fly the helicopter”. By immediately entering and maintaining an autorotation Jim was able to maintain main rotor RPM in the proper range. Even though his landing options were next to non-existent Jim continued to “fly the helicopter” by maintaining airspeed to allow for the all-important flare that he knew he would need to execute to slow the helicopter as he descended into the forest canopy.
As the tree tops rushed up to meet them, Jim told Mia to hold on as he executed a perfect flare just above the tree tops. He said that he continued to fly the helicopter as it fell through the tree branches chopping wood all the way down. The ride down felt like slow motion to both Jim and Mia. At some point during the crashing, chopping, ripping and twisting ride through the oak tree canopy the helicopter rolled onto it’s left side and impacted the ground as Jim continued to manipulate the controls. Jim and Mia were alive!
[Image: skidsup.jpg]
As they lay on the ground inside the battered fuselage fuel began pouring from the fuel sender fitting (due to the weak attaching method Rotorway uses for attaching the fuel sender. If you are flying a Rotorway, now is a good time to modify this attachment with rivets or nut plates installed on the inside of the tank flange). Jim yelled for Mia to get out fearing that the helicopter would burst into flames. Before he unbuckled his seat belt he flipped off all of the electrical switches and turned the fuel valve to the off position. He then unbuckled the seat belt and fell to the ground on his back but could not exit the helicopter because his left leg was pinned between the instrument console and a large tree branch. The impact of the crash snapped the pilot cyclic control and it was also wedged against his leg. Mia scrambled out of the wreckage and tried to free Jim’s trapped leg before the gushing fuel might be ignited by the hot engine. It was no use, his left leg had sustained double compound fractures with the bones sticking out of his pant leg and the lower part of his leg was held fast between the instrument panel and the tree.
The couple joined forces and with his right leg Jim pushed up with all of his might on the instrument panel and Mia lifted the nose of the helicopter with all the strength that she had. The wreckage shifted just enough that Jim was able to grab his leg with both hands slide it free. The leg flopped onto the ground with both leg bones protruding from his torn flesh and ripped pant leg. With Mia’s help he was able to semi crab crawl away from the ship.
It was immediately obvious that Jim needed immediate medical attention. Since Mia had sustained only a few minor scratches in the accident and because the fuel had not ignited Jim asked her if she still had her camera, she did. He asked her to start taking pictures and those are the photos that you are viewing in this article.
As he lay on the ground he looked around and noticed that laying right next to him were two branches that had been chopped off by the main rotors and a roll of electrical tape that had been in the floor storage compartment. Grabbing the branches and the tape he fashioned a splint to immobilize his leg and then crawled as far as he could from the wreckage. Another miracle was that lying right next to the roll of tape on the ground was Jim’s cell phone. Mia was able to use the phone to call 911 and rescue services were mobilized. The phone had GPS capability that enabled the 911 operator to pinpoint the location of the crash.
Soon rescue vehicles could be heard in the distance and a helicopter seen overhead but the emergency services could not spot the wreckage due to the dense tree canopy. Mia hiked through the dense brush to an clearing where she was able to flag down the rescue service personnel and lead them to her injured husband. He was stabilized and carried to the waiting medevac helicopter that had landed in a nearby clearing and then transported to the Kansas University Hospital.
[Image: Jim7.jpg]
Jim has made a full recovery from his accident and is now flying for Air Evac as a medevac helicopter pilot.
Jim asked me to print this quote from him “If it wasn’t for Orv’s autorotation training, it would not have turned out as well as it did. Orv taught me to always fly the helicopter all the way to the ground. I few it to the trees, through the trees and was still on the controls when I was upside down on the ground. I stopped piloting when it stopped moving. Orv and I must have done 100 or more autos in my Rotorway and it was just natural to immediately enter an auto when I knew we were in trouble”.
[Image: Jim6.jpg]
Mia added “ Having Orv come to our home to give Jimmy his flight instruction and auto training was the best money we ever spent. The training that Orv gave Jim saved our lives. That is why we invited Orv & Sheila to celebrate our 25th anniversary with us on an Alaska cruise.”
We had a great Alaskan cruise with Jim and Mia this past June. Jim is now in the process of rebuilding his bent Rotorway and plans on having it flying by the spring of 2008. If you remember anything from these stories it should be: 1. Always maintain main rotor rpm while in flight, and 2. If in doubt, AUTO OUT!!.
Jim is now the lead pilot of the Poplar Bluff Missouri Air Evac helicopter air ambulance company. In spite of this set-back, Jim's little Rotorway made his dream of flying medevac helicopters become a reality.]]> <![CDATA[40,000 hour pilot killed due to fuel exhaustion in bad weather.]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-183.html Thu, 13 Aug 2026 16:50:41 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-183.html https://www.facebook.com/share/1FEgi67w1...tid=wwXIfr

This was the nicest Jet Exec that I had ever inspected. I did the pre purchase inspection for the new buyer and told him that it was a really nice machine. I told him that I would be happy to provide him with transition training in his helicopter but he said he had a friend who would do that for him.

The friend picked up the helicopter and got 5 hours of stormy weather flying before he went down in the firestorm due to fuel exhaustion. The NTSB report is an interesting read.]]> https://www.facebook.com/share/1FEgi67w1...tid=wwXIfr

This was the nicest Jet Exec that I had ever inspected. I did the pre purchase inspection for the new buyer and told him that it was a really nice machine. I told him that I would be happy to provide him with transition training in his helicopter but he said he had a friend who would do that for him.

The friend picked up the helicopter and got 5 hours of stormy weather flying before he went down in the firestorm due to fuel exhaustion. The NTSB report is an interesting read.]]> <![CDATA[Slider Ball Clamp slipped locking collective in up position in flight.]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-181.html Thu, 13 Aug 2026 08:16:03 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-181.html
The helicopter began to climb, and climb fast, with the powerful turbine engine powering it's rotor system. I emphatically called out to my student "I've got it", those special words that I reserve for the times when I need the student completely off of the helicopter's controls. I took the controls and tried to force the collective down but it would not move down at all. I then slightly decreased the throttle on the Jet Exec to achieve a main rotor RPM of around 92 percent but the helicopter continued to climb. I knew that eventually we would run out of power and stall the main rotor blades ending in our demise. I then remembered that rapid erratic cyclic inputs would severely dump lift so I began to move the cyclic control from stop to stop in all directions causing the helicopter to loose lift and settle to the ground where I was able to slide it on (it had the extended skid modification which one again prevented the helicopter from nosing over with forward ground contact).

A word of caution here, we were in a life and death situation and the only way that I could stop the rapid climb was to reduce the main rotor RPM to decrease the lift being produced along with very aggressive cyclic inputs. Doing this in flight and especially in a high rotor pitch angle climb is very risky and if the rotor RPM is allowed to decrease much below that point the main rotors will stall and the helicopter will fall like a rock. I had no choice and did what I needed to do to cause the helicopter to descend and slide onto the surface.

Upon investigating the cause of the lock-up we discovered the problem. My student had purchased a rolled over helicopter in Texas. He completely rebuilt it before I arrived. The torque on the nut securing the Slider Ball Clamp (collar) to the main rotor shaft had been checked by me when I arrived a the students home. The torque value on the NUT was correct but the collar still slipped down allowing the alignment forks to exit the top of the collar and rotate away from their slots in the collar. The forks now effectively blocked the collective control from moving the swashplate downward to lower the pitch on the main rotor blades.
Upon examination after the lockup we found that the clamping bolt had corroded threads. The bolt thread condition caused the nylock nut to achieve the proper torque, but before the nut was far enough onto the bolt to securely clamp the collar to the shaft. The person installing the collar must have used a defective bolt to secure it. I now gently but firmly pry down on the collar on every ship I apply downward pressure on the collar to insure that it has the proper clamping pressure so that it will not move. I also check the torque on both the nut and the bolt head to insure that both are at the proper setting to achieve the required clamping force on the collar.

The photo below was taken after we landed. You can clearly see the forks sitting out of their slots and resting on top of the collar which prevents them from being able to be lowered.
 =100%[Image: Imported%20Photos%2000001.jpg]=100%After we re-positioned and secured the collar above and completed Ron's flight instruction, I headed to Pennsylvania to provide another student with advanced flight training. I was performing an airworthiness inspection on this student's Rotorway Exec 90 when I noticed the collar position looked too low. When I pulled full up-collective the fork came completely out of the collar. We checked the torque settings and they were incorrect for the nut and bolt head, they were loose.
This student had been flying it that way at altitude and if he had ever been put into the position of applying full up-collective the fork would have come out of the guide slots and rotated away from them. This would again have jammed the collective in the full-pitch position. Had that happened it could have ended up in an unhappy ending! Everyone should check the position and security of this collar. That was the second collar issue found in 2 weeks. The photo below was taken before we slid this second collar back into position and properly torquing the clamping bolt.

 =100%[Image: Bills%20collar2.jpg]=100%This method of securing the collar to the main shaft is very effective but the installation must be done to the factory standards. It is the responsibility of the owner/builder to check the integrity of the clampinb bolt to insure proper securring of the collar to prevent it from moving. [Image: ColSczrBrkt.jpg]The photo above shows a properly placed collar and this builder also fabricated a reinforced collective scissor bracket. I have seen this bracket break in the past. The break occured at the 90 degree bend and is most likely from improper technique used in bending the bracket ears performed by the builder. Those bends should be radiused as per the factory drawings.  The following week I was off to Connecticut and of course now the first thing on this students ship that I checked was his locking collar. When I applied downward pressure on the collar with a piece of wood and a fulcrum the collar slipped down easily. We checked the torque on the nut and it turned and turned and turned but would not tighten. It took us nearly an hour to get the locknut with stripped threads off the bolt and as you can clearly see in the photo below the installer had used a bolt that was the next size longer than called for in the factory specs.
When the nut was tightened it ran out of threads and rode up onto the shank of the bolt stripping the nut's threads. With the threads stripped the collar could not apply the required clamping force onto the main rotor shaft. It could have eventually slid down to the point that the forks could clear the collar, rotate, and jam the collective in the full up-collective position.

 [Image: SlipRing2.jpg]I urge everyone to check their collars prior to flight. This series of loose collars is not common because I have only found one loose clamping ring since.]]>
The helicopter began to climb, and climb fast, with the powerful turbine engine powering it's rotor system. I emphatically called out to my student "I've got it", those special words that I reserve for the times when I need the student completely off of the helicopter's controls. I took the controls and tried to force the collective down but it would not move down at all. I then slightly decreased the throttle on the Jet Exec to achieve a main rotor RPM of around 92 percent but the helicopter continued to climb. I knew that eventually we would run out of power and stall the main rotor blades ending in our demise. I then remembered that rapid erratic cyclic inputs would severely dump lift so I began to move the cyclic control from stop to stop in all directions causing the helicopter to loose lift and settle to the ground where I was able to slide it on (it had the extended skid modification which one again prevented the helicopter from nosing over with forward ground contact).

A word of caution here, we were in a life and death situation and the only way that I could stop the rapid climb was to reduce the main rotor RPM to decrease the lift being produced along with very aggressive cyclic inputs. Doing this in flight and especially in a high rotor pitch angle climb is very risky and if the rotor RPM is allowed to decrease much below that point the main rotors will stall and the helicopter will fall like a rock. I had no choice and did what I needed to do to cause the helicopter to descend and slide onto the surface.

Upon investigating the cause of the lock-up we discovered the problem. My student had purchased a rolled over helicopter in Texas. He completely rebuilt it before I arrived. The torque on the nut securing the Slider Ball Clamp (collar) to the main rotor shaft had been checked by me when I arrived a the students home. The torque value on the NUT was correct but the collar still slipped down allowing the alignment forks to exit the top of the collar and rotate away from their slots in the collar. The forks now effectively blocked the collective control from moving the swashplate downward to lower the pitch on the main rotor blades.
Upon examination after the lockup we found that the clamping bolt had corroded threads. The bolt thread condition caused the nylock nut to achieve the proper torque, but before the nut was far enough onto the bolt to securely clamp the collar to the shaft. The person installing the collar must have used a defective bolt to secure it. I now gently but firmly pry down on the collar on every ship I apply downward pressure on the collar to insure that it has the proper clamping pressure so that it will not move. I also check the torque on both the nut and the bolt head to insure that both are at the proper setting to achieve the required clamping force on the collar.

The photo below was taken after we landed. You can clearly see the forks sitting out of their slots and resting on top of the collar which prevents them from being able to be lowered.
 =100%[Image: Imported%20Photos%2000001.jpg]=100%After we re-positioned and secured the collar above and completed Ron's flight instruction, I headed to Pennsylvania to provide another student with advanced flight training. I was performing an airworthiness inspection on this student's Rotorway Exec 90 when I noticed the collar position looked too low. When I pulled full up-collective the fork came completely out of the collar. We checked the torque settings and they were incorrect for the nut and bolt head, they were loose.
This student had been flying it that way at altitude and if he had ever been put into the position of applying full up-collective the fork would have come out of the guide slots and rotated away from them. This would again have jammed the collective in the full-pitch position. Had that happened it could have ended up in an unhappy ending! Everyone should check the position and security of this collar. That was the second collar issue found in 2 weeks. The photo below was taken before we slid this second collar back into position and properly torquing the clamping bolt.

 =100%[Image: Bills%20collar2.jpg]=100%This method of securing the collar to the main shaft is very effective but the installation must be done to the factory standards. It is the responsibility of the owner/builder to check the integrity of the clampinb bolt to insure proper securring of the collar to prevent it from moving. [Image: ColSczrBrkt.jpg]The photo above shows a properly placed collar and this builder also fabricated a reinforced collective scissor bracket. I have seen this bracket break in the past. The break occured at the 90 degree bend and is most likely from improper technique used in bending the bracket ears performed by the builder. Those bends should be radiused as per the factory drawings.  The following week I was off to Connecticut and of course now the first thing on this students ship that I checked was his locking collar. When I applied downward pressure on the collar with a piece of wood and a fulcrum the collar slipped down easily. We checked the torque on the nut and it turned and turned and turned but would not tighten. It took us nearly an hour to get the locknut with stripped threads off the bolt and as you can clearly see in the photo below the installer had used a bolt that was the next size longer than called for in the factory specs.
When the nut was tightened it ran out of threads and rode up onto the shank of the bolt stripping the nut's threads. With the threads stripped the collar could not apply the required clamping force onto the main rotor shaft. It could have eventually slid down to the point that the forks could clear the collar, rotate, and jam the collective in the full up-collective position.

 [Image: SlipRing2.jpg]I urge everyone to check their collars prior to flight. This series of loose collars is not common because I have only found one loose clamping ring since.]]> <![CDATA[Fuel exhaustion fatality.]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-179.html Wed, 12 Aug 2026 07:27:30 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-179.html
4 people died because a pilot was texting instead of checking fuel. This one is hard to read.

The helicopter was a Eurocopter AS350 B2, call sign N352LN, operated by Air Methods Corporation as an EMS flight under Part 135. The crew was a pilot, flight nurse, and flight paramedic. They had a patient on board.

The flight originated from Harrison County Community Hospital in Bethany, Missouri around 1811. The plan was straightforward: fly to the Midwest National Air Center in Mosby, Missouri to refuel, then continue 7 nautical miles to Liberty Hospital to deliver the patient.

The pilot knew fuel was critically low before the first departure. He knew it again before the second.

He departed anyway. Both times.

The NTSB found that the pilot was texting during safety-critical ground and flight operations. Not glancing at a phone. Texting. During preflight. During operations where a fuel check should have been non-negotiable.

He also carried fatigue into that cockpit.

At approximately 1841, 30 minutes after departure from Bethany, the engine lost power. Fuel exhaustion. The pilot attempted to enter an autorotation, but he did not successfully complete it. The helicopter impacted the ground near GPH.

The pilot, flight nurse, flight paramedic, and patient were all killed.

The NTSB later noted that the pilot's autorotation training in the AS350 B2 had not included practice representative of an actual engine failure at cruise airspeed. That gap mattered in the last seconds.

There was no operational policy requiring the pilot to notify the control center about an abnormal fuel situation. No backstop. No one on the ground who could have interrupted what was unfolding.

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

NTSB Probable Cause: The pilot's failure to confirm that the helicopter had adequate fuel on board to complete the mission before making the first departure, his improper decision to continue the mission and make a second departure after he became aware of a critically low fuel level, and his failure to successfully enter an autorotation when the engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion. Contributing to the accident were (1) the pilot's distracted attention due to personal texting during safety-critical ground and flight operations, (2) his degraded performance due to fatigue, (3) the operator's lack of a policy requiring that an operational control center specialist be notified of abnormal fuel situations, and (4) the lack of practice representative of an actual engine failure at cruise airspeed in the pilot's autorotation training in the accident make and model helicopter.

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

Fuel state is not a suggestion to check when convenient. Check it before departure, confirm it before every subsequent departure, and if the number is wrong, you don't fly until it isn't.

📋 August 26, 2011 · Eurocopter AS350 B2 · N352LN · 4 fatal

#PilotDebrief #FuelManagement #EMSAviation]]>
4 people died because a pilot was texting instead of checking fuel. This one is hard to read.

The helicopter was a Eurocopter AS350 B2, call sign N352LN, operated by Air Methods Corporation as an EMS flight under Part 135. The crew was a pilot, flight nurse, and flight paramedic. They had a patient on board.

The flight originated from Harrison County Community Hospital in Bethany, Missouri around 1811. The plan was straightforward: fly to the Midwest National Air Center in Mosby, Missouri to refuel, then continue 7 nautical miles to Liberty Hospital to deliver the patient.

The pilot knew fuel was critically low before the first departure. He knew it again before the second.

He departed anyway. Both times.

The NTSB found that the pilot was texting during safety-critical ground and flight operations. Not glancing at a phone. Texting. During preflight. During operations where a fuel check should have been non-negotiable.

He also carried fatigue into that cockpit.

At approximately 1841, 30 minutes after departure from Bethany, the engine lost power. Fuel exhaustion. The pilot attempted to enter an autorotation, but he did not successfully complete it. The helicopter impacted the ground near GPH.

The pilot, flight nurse, flight paramedic, and patient were all killed.

The NTSB later noted that the pilot's autorotation training in the AS350 B2 had not included practice representative of an actual engine failure at cruise airspeed. That gap mattered in the last seconds.

There was no operational policy requiring the pilot to notify the control center about an abnormal fuel situation. No backstop. No one on the ground who could have interrupted what was unfolding.

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

NTSB Probable Cause: The pilot's failure to confirm that the helicopter had adequate fuel on board to complete the mission before making the first departure, his improper decision to continue the mission and make a second departure after he became aware of a critically low fuel level, and his failure to successfully enter an autorotation when the engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion. Contributing to the accident were (1) the pilot's distracted attention due to personal texting during safety-critical ground and flight operations, (2) his degraded performance due to fatigue, (3) the operator's lack of a policy requiring that an operational control center specialist be notified of abnormal fuel situations, and (4) the lack of practice representative of an actual engine failure at cruise airspeed in the pilot's autorotation training in the accident make and model helicopter.

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

Fuel state is not a suggestion to check when convenient. Check it before departure, confirm it before every subsequent departure, and if the number is wrong, you don't fly until it isn't.

📋 August 26, 2011 · Eurocopter AS350 B2 · N352LN · 4 fatal

#PilotDebrief #FuelManagement #EMSAviation]]> <![CDATA[Tail rotor shaft break]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-175.html Sat, 08 Aug 2026 07:15:53 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-175.html
The new owner of this Exec 90 owned a jet charter service and was an accomplished pilot. He purchased the Exec 90 to see if he had the aptitude to learn to fly helicopters before investing in a certified ship. He was the third owner and the logbooks indicated that only scheduled maintenance had been performed on this helicopter with no damage history indicated. I did notice that the tail rotor blades looked like they had been recently painted due to the lack of paint chipping on the leading edges. This should have raised some concern but at that time it did not register as anything to investigate..big mistake on my part.  

We were able to find a hover area away from all of the Robinson traffic and conducted his hover training which he picked up on quickly. After several days of hover training, it was time to take the helicopter to altitude but the traffic pattern was very congested for initial flight training so we elected to fly out to the coast and then fly south to Long Beach where there was less congestion. The flight out to the coast was over very heavily congested residential and commercial development so once we reached the coast and open beaches I relaxed a little. 

The first day we flew down the coast to Long Beach and practiced traffic patterns over the Long Beach container port where there was a lot of open space in case we needed to land in an emergency. We made several trips down to Long beach that day with returns to Torrance to refuel. 

The next day we planned to repeat our route for more altitude training so we again flew over all of the developed congestion between Torrance and the coast then turned left to follow the coast line south. We could see a large fog bank about a mile off the shore line and saw a few wisps of fog drifting toward the beach area. We decided that if the fog came in (it was not predicted to come in) we could be stuck in Long Beach and not able to return to Torrance so we executed a 180 degree turn and returned to his home airport. 

We made our radio calls and made our approach to the taxiway and set down at Torrance. As we rolled the throttle back to idle to talk, I heard a distinctive tic.tick.tic from the tail rotor area of the helicopter. I told my student to shut the engine down as I got out to investigate the origin of the ticking noise. As I was standing next to the winding down tail rotor it suddenly wobbled dramatically and the entire tail rotor assembly from the pulley outward fell off and was just hanging by the anti-torque cable. 

Had that happened anywhere else in our flight we would have been in real trouble, God had protected us to have it happen once we were safe on the ground. In the hangar we pulled the remaining portion of the tail rotor shaft out and found that someone had previously drilled a second set of holes in the tail rotor shaft for the tail rotor pulley bolt. The tail rotor shaft now had four holes instead of the two for the pulley bolt.

The two bolt holes that were not being used by the bolt were oblong from an obvious sudden stop like a tail rotor strike. A crack had propagated unseen under the pulley and traveled the weakest route, from hole to hole until the shaft just broke free. Finding this we called the Rotorway factory and inquired about any tail rotor parts sold to the previous owner. They confirmed that they had recently shipped a new set of tail rotor blades and pitch pins to the previous  owner due to a ground strike which destroyed both tail rotor blades and bent the pitch pins on both blades. 

The previous owner had replaced the blades and pitch pins, had seen the oblong holes in the shaft for pulley mount bolt, and had elected to just drill new holes and not use the oblong holes. The tail rotor strike was severe enough to bend the pitch pins and that force was severe enough to deform the pulley bolt holes so obviously the tail rotor shaft should also have been replaced, but it was not. 

The previous owner made no entry in the log book regarding replacing the tail rotor blades and pitch pins so we did not have any warning to look further until the shaft failed on us. I feel so blessed that this happened when sitting on the ground. Had the fog not caused us to make the decision to turn around and return to Torrance, it could have been a very different story to tell if I was still alive to tell it.Many years ago I was hired to provide flight instruction in an Exec 90 at the Torrance, CA airport. This is the same airport where the Robinson factory is located. As you can imagine, this is a very busy airport with lots of R22 and R44 test flights being conducted on new aircraft prior to delivery. 

The new owner of this Exec 90 owned a jet charter service and was an accomplished pilot. He purchased the Exec 90 to see if he had the aptitude to learn to fly helicopters before investing in a certified ship. He was the third owner and the logbooks indicated that only scheduled maintenance had been performed on this helicopter with no damage history indicated. I did notice that the tail rotor blades looked like they had been recently painted due to the lack of paint chipping on the leading edges. This should have raised some concern but at that time it did not register as anything to investigate..big mistake on my part.  

We were able to find a hover area away from all of the Robinson traffic and conducted his hover training which he picked up on quickly. After several days of hover training, it was time to take the helicopter to altitude but the traffic pattern was very congested for initial flight training so we elected to fly out to the coast and then fly south to Long Beach where there was less congestion. The flight out to the coast was over very heavily congested residential and commercial development so once we reached the coast and open beaches I relaxed a little. 

The first day we flew down the coast to Long Beach and practiced traffic patterns over the Long Beach container port where there was a lot of open space in case we needed to land in an emergency. We made several trips down to Long beach that day with returns to Torrance to refuel. 

The next day we planned to repeat our route for more altitude training so we again flew over all of the developed congestion between Torrance and the coast then turned left to follow the coast line south. We could see a large fog bank about a mile off the shore line and saw a few wisps of fog drifting toward the beach area. We decided that if the fog came in (it was not predicted to come in) we could be stuck in Long Beach and not able to return to Torrance so we executed a 180 degree turn and returned to his home airport. 

We made our radio calls and made our approach to the taxiway and set down at Torrance. As we rolled the throttle back to idle to talk, I heard a distinctive tic.tick.tic from the tail rotor area of the helicopter. I told my student to shut the engine down as I got out to investigate the origin of the ticking noise. As I was standing next to the winding down tail rotor it suddenly wobbled dramatically and the entire tail rotor assembly from the pulley outward fell off and was just hanging by the anti-torque cable. 

Had that happened anywhere else in our flight we would have been in real trouble, God had protected us to have it happen once we were safe on the ground. In the hangar we pulled the remaining portion of the tail rotor shaft out and found that someone had previously drilled a second set of holes in the tail rotor shaft for the tail rotor pulley bolt. The tail rotor shaft now had four holes instead of the two for the pulley bolt.

The two bolt holes that were not being used by the bolt were oblong from an obvious sudden stop like a tail rotor strike. A crack had propagated unseen under the pulley and traveled the weakest route, from hole to hole until the shaft just broke free. Finding this we called the Rotorway factory and inquired about any tail rotor parts sold to the previous owner. They confirmed that they had recently shipped a new set of tail rotor blades and pitch pins to the previous  owner due to a ground strike which destroyed both tail rotor blades and bent the pitch pins on both blades. 

The previous owner had replaced the blades and pitch pins, had seen the oblong holes in the shaft for pulley mount bolt, and had elected to just drill new holes and not use the oblong holes. The tail rotor strike was severe enough to bend the pitch pins and that force was severe enough to deform the pulley bolt holes so obviously the tail rotor shaft should also have been replaced, but it was not. 

The previous owner made no entry in the log book regarding replacing the tail rotor blades and pitch pins so we did not have any warning to look further until the shaft failed on us. I feel so blessed that this happened when sitting on the ground. Had the fog not caused us to make the decision to turn around and return to Torrance, it could have been a very different story to tell if I was still alive to tell it.

Daniel Meisner posted this photo of what he found on a tail rotor shaft after removing the pulley.

[Image: IMG-7625.png]]]>
The new owner of this Exec 90 owned a jet charter service and was an accomplished pilot. He purchased the Exec 90 to see if he had the aptitude to learn to fly helicopters before investing in a certified ship. He was the third owner and the logbooks indicated that only scheduled maintenance had been performed on this helicopter with no damage history indicated. I did notice that the tail rotor blades looked like they had been recently painted due to the lack of paint chipping on the leading edges. This should have raised some concern but at that time it did not register as anything to investigate..big mistake on my part.  

We were able to find a hover area away from all of the Robinson traffic and conducted his hover training which he picked up on quickly. After several days of hover training, it was time to take the helicopter to altitude but the traffic pattern was very congested for initial flight training so we elected to fly out to the coast and then fly south to Long Beach where there was less congestion. The flight out to the coast was over very heavily congested residential and commercial development so once we reached the coast and open beaches I relaxed a little. 

The first day we flew down the coast to Long Beach and practiced traffic patterns over the Long Beach container port where there was a lot of open space in case we needed to land in an emergency. We made several trips down to Long beach that day with returns to Torrance to refuel. 

The next day we planned to repeat our route for more altitude training so we again flew over all of the developed congestion between Torrance and the coast then turned left to follow the coast line south. We could see a large fog bank about a mile off the shore line and saw a few wisps of fog drifting toward the beach area. We decided that if the fog came in (it was not predicted to come in) we could be stuck in Long Beach and not able to return to Torrance so we executed a 180 degree turn and returned to his home airport. 

We made our radio calls and made our approach to the taxiway and set down at Torrance. As we rolled the throttle back to idle to talk, I heard a distinctive tic.tick.tic from the tail rotor area of the helicopter. I told my student to shut the engine down as I got out to investigate the origin of the ticking noise. As I was standing next to the winding down tail rotor it suddenly wobbled dramatically and the entire tail rotor assembly from the pulley outward fell off and was just hanging by the anti-torque cable. 

Had that happened anywhere else in our flight we would have been in real trouble, God had protected us to have it happen once we were safe on the ground. In the hangar we pulled the remaining portion of the tail rotor shaft out and found that someone had previously drilled a second set of holes in the tail rotor shaft for the tail rotor pulley bolt. The tail rotor shaft now had four holes instead of the two for the pulley bolt.

The two bolt holes that were not being used by the bolt were oblong from an obvious sudden stop like a tail rotor strike. A crack had propagated unseen under the pulley and traveled the weakest route, from hole to hole until the shaft just broke free. Finding this we called the Rotorway factory and inquired about any tail rotor parts sold to the previous owner. They confirmed that they had recently shipped a new set of tail rotor blades and pitch pins to the previous  owner due to a ground strike which destroyed both tail rotor blades and bent the pitch pins on both blades. 

The previous owner had replaced the blades and pitch pins, had seen the oblong holes in the shaft for pulley mount bolt, and had elected to just drill new holes and not use the oblong holes. The tail rotor strike was severe enough to bend the pitch pins and that force was severe enough to deform the pulley bolt holes so obviously the tail rotor shaft should also have been replaced, but it was not. 

The previous owner made no entry in the log book regarding replacing the tail rotor blades and pitch pins so we did not have any warning to look further until the shaft failed on us. I feel so blessed that this happened when sitting on the ground. Had the fog not caused us to make the decision to turn around and return to Torrance, it could have been a very different story to tell if I was still alive to tell it.Many years ago I was hired to provide flight instruction in an Exec 90 at the Torrance, CA airport. This is the same airport where the Robinson factory is located. As you can imagine, this is a very busy airport with lots of R22 and R44 test flights being conducted on new aircraft prior to delivery. 

The new owner of this Exec 90 owned a jet charter service and was an accomplished pilot. He purchased the Exec 90 to see if he had the aptitude to learn to fly helicopters before investing in a certified ship. He was the third owner and the logbooks indicated that only scheduled maintenance had been performed on this helicopter with no damage history indicated. I did notice that the tail rotor blades looked like they had been recently painted due to the lack of paint chipping on the leading edges. This should have raised some concern but at that time it did not register as anything to investigate..big mistake on my part.  

We were able to find a hover area away from all of the Robinson traffic and conducted his hover training which he picked up on quickly. After several days of hover training, it was time to take the helicopter to altitude but the traffic pattern was very congested for initial flight training so we elected to fly out to the coast and then fly south to Long Beach where there was less congestion. The flight out to the coast was over very heavily congested residential and commercial development so once we reached the coast and open beaches I relaxed a little. 

The first day we flew down the coast to Long Beach and practiced traffic patterns over the Long Beach container port where there was a lot of open space in case we needed to land in an emergency. We made several trips down to Long beach that day with returns to Torrance to refuel. 

The next day we planned to repeat our route for more altitude training so we again flew over all of the developed congestion between Torrance and the coast then turned left to follow the coast line south. We could see a large fog bank about a mile off the shore line and saw a few wisps of fog drifting toward the beach area. We decided that if the fog came in (it was not predicted to come in) we could be stuck in Long Beach and not able to return to Torrance so we executed a 180 degree turn and returned to his home airport. 

We made our radio calls and made our approach to the taxiway and set down at Torrance. As we rolled the throttle back to idle to talk, I heard a distinctive tic.tick.tic from the tail rotor area of the helicopter. I told my student to shut the engine down as I got out to investigate the origin of the ticking noise. As I was standing next to the winding down tail rotor it suddenly wobbled dramatically and the entire tail rotor assembly from the pulley outward fell off and was just hanging by the anti-torque cable. 

Had that happened anywhere else in our flight we would have been in real trouble, God had protected us to have it happen once we were safe on the ground. In the hangar we pulled the remaining portion of the tail rotor shaft out and found that someone had previously drilled a second set of holes in the tail rotor shaft for the tail rotor pulley bolt. The tail rotor shaft now had four holes instead of the two for the pulley bolt.

The two bolt holes that were not being used by the bolt were oblong from an obvious sudden stop like a tail rotor strike. A crack had propagated unseen under the pulley and traveled the weakest route, from hole to hole until the shaft just broke free. Finding this we called the Rotorway factory and inquired about any tail rotor parts sold to the previous owner. They confirmed that they had recently shipped a new set of tail rotor blades and pitch pins to the previous  owner due to a ground strike which destroyed both tail rotor blades and bent the pitch pins on both blades. 

The previous owner had replaced the blades and pitch pins, had seen the oblong holes in the shaft for pulley mount bolt, and had elected to just drill new holes and not use the oblong holes. The tail rotor strike was severe enough to bend the pitch pins and that force was severe enough to deform the pulley bolt holes so obviously the tail rotor shaft should also have been replaced, but it was not. 

The previous owner made no entry in the log book regarding replacing the tail rotor blades and pitch pins so we did not have any warning to look further until the shaft failed on us. I feel so blessed that this happened when sitting on the ground. Had the fog not caused us to make the decision to turn around and return to Torrance, it could have been a very different story to tell if I was still alive to tell it.

Daniel Meisner posted this photo of what he found on a tail rotor shaft after removing the pulley.

[Image: IMG-7625.png]]]> <![CDATA[Complacency can lead to fatality]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-168.html Wed, 05 Aug 2026 08:54:16 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-168.html
When I got home I followed the factory advice to tie the helicopter down with ropes and try lifting off solo. All I achieved by doing that was to have the helicopter slide sideways and hang precariously by the rope and with one skid in the air and one on the ground. This was not what I was comfortable with. I called Bill and he told me to bring my Exec up to Lake Beryessa and he would help me out. I hauled it up to the large asphalt parking lot near the boat ramp and unloaded it from my trailer and about that time Bill flew in with his Exec 152 and landed. 

Once the helicopter was ready to fly Bill got into the passenger seat and was there to assist me if I needed him. I was able to perform a very nice lift off with Bill just sitting there and realized that all I had needed was for the helicopter to be properly balanced/balasted like it was in flight training and then I could hover it. We hovered together for about an hour then Bill asked me if I would like to go from a ride in his Exec over the lake. That sounded great to me so  we got into his ship and lifted off. Remember that these Execs had single ignition one plug per cylinder fed by an upside down distributor powered by a Malory coil that was prone to failure (but I did not know that at the time). 

The lake was at a historic low due to the drought and Bill wanted to show me an old flooded town that was now beginning to be visible as the water level dropped. We flew way out over the lake at around 50 feet over the water and waved at some boaters as we enjoyed the flight. I was oblivious to the danger of flying so low over the water with no place to land in an emergency but ignorance is bliss, so they say. 
Here is a photo that I took of Bill flying at one of our gatherings.


[Image: IMG-0045.jpg]



As we approached the sunken town Bill slowed the helicopter below ETL for us to get a good look and as he did so the helicopter began to descend toward the water. I saw the rotor RPM decreasing as Bill applied full throttle but we were going down. There was a very small island with steep gravel banks next to us so Bill was able to just make it to a landing on that slope with the nose pointing up the steep hill and the tail rotor just inches above the water. At least we did not crash into the lake. 

Bill shut the helicopter down and we got out to assess the situation. Bill asked me what I would do to get us off the island safely. I told him that he was the trained pilot and he responded that he had a couple of hours in an R22 then then began flying his Exec with no further flight training. I had no other helicopter experience than my hover training at Rotorway and the one hour of hover with Bill so I told him that it seemed like our only option was to get in, run the rotor RPM up to red line, then jump the helicopter off the steep slope otherwise if we just got light it would slide into the water. Bill thought that might work so we got in and fired up the engine. Bill ran the RPM up to red line as this ignorant conspirator suggested and then yanked the collective up popping us up and backwards out over the water without the tail rotor contacting the lake. He dumped the nose, gained airspeed and we actually were able to pass through ETL before contacting the water. 

We made it back to the parking lot and landed and at that time I learned a very valuable lesson. Do not assume that just because a person is flying their own helicopter, they are well trained and experienced. There were several dangerous things that Bill did on that flight. First he flew at low altitude over the water with no escape plan should the helicopter experience an emergency. Second he slowed to below ETL over water which provides little or no ground effect to help with lift, third is he trusted the advice of his passenger that had virtually no flight experience in helicopters. The Lord was good to us and we made it back safely. 

As I completed my flight training at the Rotorway factory and earned my private pilot Rotorcraft Helicopter certificate I got heavily involved with the Sierra Rotorcraft club. Most of our members were from California including Jeff Dunham the ventriloquist who always brought Peanut, Arthur, and Jose to our meets in northern California. At the time that I earned my rotorcraft rating, there were only about three members of the club that had their helicopter ratings. Others had beautiful helicopters but would bring them to the gathering, polish them, start the engines and run them on the ground but they did not know how to fly them. I began flying with those members that wanted to learn. 

One of our members Len C. was a CFI but had been in an accident and had his legs crushed so he wore heavy metal braces. He could not operate the anti-torque pedals so I would fly with the student pilot and Len would direct us on the radio as he sat and watched us go through the maneuvers. We ended up getting most of the club members trained in their helicopters by this method. More to come.
[Image: IMG-4822.jpg]

At the time the in house DPE was Stretch Walter who is pictured handing me my R/H certification.
Bill's story continued:

We had many years of fun meets around various locations in northern California. We also did a lot of group fly-outs to explore new areas. Remember that these early Execs were no where near as reliable as our current Exec 90s, 162Fs and Talons. One such adventure began at our property in Vacaville, CA where Steve L, Bill C, Dan V, and Sheila and I in our 152 departed for an air show in Marysville about 60 miles away. The flight over the fields and rice paddys was interrupted by my seeing Bill's Exec trailing a large amount of what looked like smoke. I called him on the radio and told him to land. We discovered that one of his coolant hoses had developed a hole that allowed antifreeze to spray onto his hot exhaust. One of us had duct tape, one had safety wire, and we had a couple of bottles of drinking water so we repaired the hose, topped off the radiator, and continued on to Marysville. The rest of the flight was uneventful and we all enjoyed the experience.

I asked Bill how old his hoses were and he said that they were the originals and were around 8 years old at that time. We were able to purchase a new hose and some antifreeze at the local hardware store in Marysville to replace that bad hose. After the air show we departed so that we could all arrive at my unlit property before dark. 

The return flight turned into quite the adventure. about half way home as the sun was nearing the horizon we again noticed a white cloud of smoke coming from Bill's engine compartment. On the radio we told Bill to land which he did into a freshly plowed field and the other three helicopters landed nearby. This time another of Bill's outdated coolant hoses sprung a leak. We uses more duct tape and safety wire to repair the hose but we had no water to fill the radiator. We noticed a farm house about a mile away so Sheila and I flew over and asked a farm worker if we could borrow a bucket and some water. They were happy to help so we got the water in a bucket and lifted off with Sheila holding the bucket out the door as we air taxied back to the group. After returning the bucket we all headed for my property but is was now twilight. Only Dan's ship and mine had position lights and landing lights so we few a staggered formation trusting that Steve and Bill would stay back and not run into us or each other. we flew into the property as a flight of 4 in the pitch black night and miraculously we all set down safely. 

We highly encouraged Bill to complete the required maintenance on his Helicopter before flying again.  To be continued. Here is a photo of the group the next morning as they were fueling up to return to their respective homes the following day after spending the night at our home. One of the helicopters is parked behind mine and is not visible in the photo.


[Image: IMG-0044.jpg]]]>
When I got home I followed the factory advice to tie the helicopter down with ropes and try lifting off solo. All I achieved by doing that was to have the helicopter slide sideways and hang precariously by the rope and with one skid in the air and one on the ground. This was not what I was comfortable with. I called Bill and he told me to bring my Exec up to Lake Beryessa and he would help me out. I hauled it up to the large asphalt parking lot near the boat ramp and unloaded it from my trailer and about that time Bill flew in with his Exec 152 and landed. 

Once the helicopter was ready to fly Bill got into the passenger seat and was there to assist me if I needed him. I was able to perform a very nice lift off with Bill just sitting there and realized that all I had needed was for the helicopter to be properly balanced/balasted like it was in flight training and then I could hover it. We hovered together for about an hour then Bill asked me if I would like to go from a ride in his Exec over the lake. That sounded great to me so  we got into his ship and lifted off. Remember that these Execs had single ignition one plug per cylinder fed by an upside down distributor powered by a Malory coil that was prone to failure (but I did not know that at the time). 

The lake was at a historic low due to the drought and Bill wanted to show me an old flooded town that was now beginning to be visible as the water level dropped. We flew way out over the lake at around 50 feet over the water and waved at some boaters as we enjoyed the flight. I was oblivious to the danger of flying so low over the water with no place to land in an emergency but ignorance is bliss, so they say. 
Here is a photo that I took of Bill flying at one of our gatherings.


[Image: IMG-0045.jpg]



As we approached the sunken town Bill slowed the helicopter below ETL for us to get a good look and as he did so the helicopter began to descend toward the water. I saw the rotor RPM decreasing as Bill applied full throttle but we were going down. There was a very small island with steep gravel banks next to us so Bill was able to just make it to a landing on that slope with the nose pointing up the steep hill and the tail rotor just inches above the water. At least we did not crash into the lake. 

Bill shut the helicopter down and we got out to assess the situation. Bill asked me what I would do to get us off the island safely. I told him that he was the trained pilot and he responded that he had a couple of hours in an R22 then then began flying his Exec with no further flight training. I had no other helicopter experience than my hover training at Rotorway and the one hour of hover with Bill so I told him that it seemed like our only option was to get in, run the rotor RPM up to red line, then jump the helicopter off the steep slope otherwise if we just got light it would slide into the water. Bill thought that might work so we got in and fired up the engine. Bill ran the RPM up to red line as this ignorant conspirator suggested and then yanked the collective up popping us up and backwards out over the water without the tail rotor contacting the lake. He dumped the nose, gained airspeed and we actually were able to pass through ETL before contacting the water. 

We made it back to the parking lot and landed and at that time I learned a very valuable lesson. Do not assume that just because a person is flying their own helicopter, they are well trained and experienced. There were several dangerous things that Bill did on that flight. First he flew at low altitude over the water with no escape plan should the helicopter experience an emergency. Second he slowed to below ETL over water which provides little or no ground effect to help with lift, third is he trusted the advice of his passenger that had virtually no flight experience in helicopters. The Lord was good to us and we made it back safely. 

As I completed my flight training at the Rotorway factory and earned my private pilot Rotorcraft Helicopter certificate I got heavily involved with the Sierra Rotorcraft club. Most of our members were from California including Jeff Dunham the ventriloquist who always brought Peanut, Arthur, and Jose to our meets in northern California. At the time that I earned my rotorcraft rating, there were only about three members of the club that had their helicopter ratings. Others had beautiful helicopters but would bring them to the gathering, polish them, start the engines and run them on the ground but they did not know how to fly them. I began flying with those members that wanted to learn. 

One of our members Len C. was a CFI but had been in an accident and had his legs crushed so he wore heavy metal braces. He could not operate the anti-torque pedals so I would fly with the student pilot and Len would direct us on the radio as he sat and watched us go through the maneuvers. We ended up getting most of the club members trained in their helicopters by this method. More to come.
[Image: IMG-4822.jpg]

At the time the in house DPE was Stretch Walter who is pictured handing me my R/H certification.
Bill's story continued:

We had many years of fun meets around various locations in northern California. We also did a lot of group fly-outs to explore new areas. Remember that these early Execs were no where near as reliable as our current Exec 90s, 162Fs and Talons. One such adventure began at our property in Vacaville, CA where Steve L, Bill C, Dan V, and Sheila and I in our 152 departed for an air show in Marysville about 60 miles away. The flight over the fields and rice paddys was interrupted by my seeing Bill's Exec trailing a large amount of what looked like smoke. I called him on the radio and told him to land. We discovered that one of his coolant hoses had developed a hole that allowed antifreeze to spray onto his hot exhaust. One of us had duct tape, one had safety wire, and we had a couple of bottles of drinking water so we repaired the hose, topped off the radiator, and continued on to Marysville. The rest of the flight was uneventful and we all enjoyed the experience.

I asked Bill how old his hoses were and he said that they were the originals and were around 8 years old at that time. We were able to purchase a new hose and some antifreeze at the local hardware store in Marysville to replace that bad hose. After the air show we departed so that we could all arrive at my unlit property before dark. 

The return flight turned into quite the adventure. about half way home as the sun was nearing the horizon we again noticed a white cloud of smoke coming from Bill's engine compartment. On the radio we told Bill to land which he did into a freshly plowed field and the other three helicopters landed nearby. This time another of Bill's outdated coolant hoses sprung a leak. We uses more duct tape and safety wire to repair the hose but we had no water to fill the radiator. We noticed a farm house about a mile away so Sheila and I flew over and asked a farm worker if we could borrow a bucket and some water. They were happy to help so we got the water in a bucket and lifted off with Sheila holding the bucket out the door as we air taxied back to the group. After returning the bucket we all headed for my property but is was now twilight. Only Dan's ship and mine had position lights and landing lights so we few a staggered formation trusting that Steve and Bill would stay back and not run into us or each other. we flew into the property as a flight of 4 in the pitch black night and miraculously we all set down safely. 

We highly encouraged Bill to complete the required maintenance on his Helicopter before flying again.  To be continued. Here is a photo of the group the next morning as they were fueling up to return to their respective homes the following day after spending the night at our home. One of the helicopters is parked behind mine and is not visible in the photo.


[Image: IMG-0044.jpg]]]> <![CDATA[Engine failure after Montana overhaul.]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-167.html Tue, 04 Aug 2026 15:56:16 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-167.html
After two years at the Montana shop my students contacted finally had his engine back and we installed it into his 162f turbo ship. We put 25 hours of hover time on the helicopter to insure that the rebuilt engine would be reliable. At that point we began his altitude training and headed to the local airport for some pattern work.

The wind had increased to around 20 knots and it was time for fuel. The wind was out of the west so we hovered up to the pumps from the east facing west. After fueling I went into great detail on how we should depart the pumps and rejoin the pattern. We had hangars to our south, the FBO building to our west, and a large maintenance hangar to the north east. I explained that we would pick up into a hover and continue to keep the nose into the wind as we began moving to the north and gaining altitude.


I explained to my student that if we followed that course we would have the best option to land the helicopter should we experience an in-flight emergency. I noted that there was a wooded area several hundred yards to our north and should we experience an emergency over those trees we could veer off to our right toward the clear area of the taxiway and runway.


We lifted off, made our radio calls and followed our planned takeoff profile. As we gained speed and altitude we were about 300 feet over the trees when the engine suddenly quit. I immediately dropped the collective and turned the helicopter to a hard right toward the runway. The stiff wind caught us and accelerated us toward the runway. I did not wish to attempt a downwind landing so I applied right pedal and cyclic to turn the ship back into the stiff west wind.


As we quickly approached the runway from the northeast I realized that if I landed on the north-south runway facing west, the airport would be shut down until we could retrieve the ground handling wheels and that would incur a lot of red tape that preferred to avoid. I had just enough rotor inertia left to set the helicopter down in the grass between the runway and taxiway preventing an airport shutdown.


We walked to the FBO, borrowed a courtesy car, and went back to my training center for the truck, trailer and ground handling wheels. On inspection we found that the builder had installed hydraulic lifters in the engine which failed breaking the cam shaft in the process. When I called the engine builder his response was “that’s interesting”. We never heard from him again.]]>
After two years at the Montana shop my students contacted finally had his engine back and we installed it into his 162f turbo ship. We put 25 hours of hover time on the helicopter to insure that the rebuilt engine would be reliable. At that point we began his altitude training and headed to the local airport for some pattern work.

The wind had increased to around 20 knots and it was time for fuel. The wind was out of the west so we hovered up to the pumps from the east facing west. After fueling I went into great detail on how we should depart the pumps and rejoin the pattern. We had hangars to our south, the FBO building to our west, and a large maintenance hangar to the north east. I explained that we would pick up into a hover and continue to keep the nose into the wind as we began moving to the north and gaining altitude.


I explained to my student that if we followed that course we would have the best option to land the helicopter should we experience an in-flight emergency. I noted that there was a wooded area several hundred yards to our north and should we experience an emergency over those trees we could veer off to our right toward the clear area of the taxiway and runway.


We lifted off, made our radio calls and followed our planned takeoff profile. As we gained speed and altitude we were about 300 feet over the trees when the engine suddenly quit. I immediately dropped the collective and turned the helicopter to a hard right toward the runway. The stiff wind caught us and accelerated us toward the runway. I did not wish to attempt a downwind landing so I applied right pedal and cyclic to turn the ship back into the stiff west wind.


As we quickly approached the runway from the northeast I realized that if I landed on the north-south runway facing west, the airport would be shut down until we could retrieve the ground handling wheels and that would incur a lot of red tape that preferred to avoid. I had just enough rotor inertia left to set the helicopter down in the grass between the runway and taxiway preventing an airport shutdown.


We walked to the FBO, borrowed a courtesy car, and went back to my training center for the truck, trailer and ground handling wheels. On inspection we found that the builder had installed hydraulic lifters in the engine which failed breaking the cam shaft in the process. When I called the engine builder his response was “that’s interesting”. We never heard from him again.]]> <![CDATA[Student pilot killed way past endorsement.]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-161.html Fri, 31 Jul 2026 07:57:23 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-161.html
N51017 Rotorway Scorpion 133 Andale, Kansas

July 5, 2024, 08:01 Local

1 Fatal Injury

Pilot Flight Time:
PPL - 128 hours (Total, all aircraft), 61.4 hours (Total, this make and model)

The pilot departed from his residence on a local area flight to practice maneuvers in the experimental helicopter. A witness heard a loud “bang” and observed debris separating from the helicopter as it descended to the ground. Surveillance camera audio captured the sound of the helicopter’s experimental engine at a constant high-power setting, followed by a momentary reduction in power. Shortly thereafter, the audio captured multiple impacts and the helicopter came into view inverted, then descended to the ground. A postimpact fire consumed the wreckage.

Postaccident examination of the wreckage found that the aft tailboom had separated from the helicopter and was located about 150 yards from the main wreckage. An impact mark consistent with the shape of a main rotor blade was noted at the right side of the tubular structure at the separation area, consistent with a main rotor blade impact.

While no mechanical anomalies were found during the airframe and engine examination, the examination was limited due to extensive fire damage.

The throttle control cable was found thermally separated from the collective control and the snap-out ball joint was not in the safety position; it was found separated from the carburetor. However, the surveillance audio of the engine’s reduction and increase of rpm before the main rotor’s impact with the tailboom are consistent with an intact throttle control and indicate that the throttle cable likely separated from the carburetor during the impact with terrain.

The pilot did not hold a helicopter rating. His last solo endorsement was October 07, 2022, and was valid until January 05, 2023. The accident occurred 18 months after the expiration of the last solo endorsement, and the pilot was not authorized to conduct solo flight operations at the time of the accident.

The pilot previously reported that he felt uncomfortable performing autorotations and requested additional training from a flight instructor; however, it was unknown what maneuvers he was performing during the accident flight.

Teetering main rotor systems, such as the one on the accident helicopter, are particularly susceptible to main rotor mast bumping during the low-G conditions that result from abrupt forward (nose-down) cyclic inputs. Based on the available evidence the pilot likely applied abrupt control inputs while performing an unknown maneuver, which resulted in main rotor mast bumping during a low-G condition and subsequent main rotor blade contact with and subsequent separation of the tailboom.

Probable Cause and Findings:
Abrupt control inputs, which resulted in a low-G condition, main rotor mast bumping, and subsequent severing of the tailboom by the main rotor blades.
[Image: 1000001549.jpg]

[Image: 1000001478.jpg]]]>
N51017 Rotorway Scorpion 133 Andale, Kansas

July 5, 2024, 08:01 Local

1 Fatal Injury

Pilot Flight Time:
PPL - 128 hours (Total, all aircraft), 61.4 hours (Total, this make and model)

The pilot departed from his residence on a local area flight to practice maneuvers in the experimental helicopter. A witness heard a loud “bang” and observed debris separating from the helicopter as it descended to the ground. Surveillance camera audio captured the sound of the helicopter’s experimental engine at a constant high-power setting, followed by a momentary reduction in power. Shortly thereafter, the audio captured multiple impacts and the helicopter came into view inverted, then descended to the ground. A postimpact fire consumed the wreckage.

Postaccident examination of the wreckage found that the aft tailboom had separated from the helicopter and was located about 150 yards from the main wreckage. An impact mark consistent with the shape of a main rotor blade was noted at the right side of the tubular structure at the separation area, consistent with a main rotor blade impact.

While no mechanical anomalies were found during the airframe and engine examination, the examination was limited due to extensive fire damage.

The throttle control cable was found thermally separated from the collective control and the snap-out ball joint was not in the safety position; it was found separated from the carburetor. However, the surveillance audio of the engine’s reduction and increase of rpm before the main rotor’s impact with the tailboom are consistent with an intact throttle control and indicate that the throttle cable likely separated from the carburetor during the impact with terrain.

The pilot did not hold a helicopter rating. His last solo endorsement was October 07, 2022, and was valid until January 05, 2023. The accident occurred 18 months after the expiration of the last solo endorsement, and the pilot was not authorized to conduct solo flight operations at the time of the accident.

The pilot previously reported that he felt uncomfortable performing autorotations and requested additional training from a flight instructor; however, it was unknown what maneuvers he was performing during the accident flight.

Teetering main rotor systems, such as the one on the accident helicopter, are particularly susceptible to main rotor mast bumping during the low-G conditions that result from abrupt forward (nose-down) cyclic inputs. Based on the available evidence the pilot likely applied abrupt control inputs while performing an unknown maneuver, which resulted in main rotor mast bumping during a low-G condition and subsequent main rotor blade contact with and subsequent separation of the tailboom.

Probable Cause and Findings:
Abrupt control inputs, which resulted in a low-G condition, main rotor mast bumping, and subsequent severing of the tailboom by the main rotor blades.
[Image: 1000001549.jpg]

[Image: 1000001478.jpg]]]> <![CDATA[After market rotor blade blow up.]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-151.html Wed, 15 Jul 2026 18:09:52 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-151.html

[Image: IMG-4786.jpg]

[Image: IMG-4787.jpg]]]>

[Image: IMG-4786.jpg]

[Image: IMG-4787.jpg]]]> <![CDATA[Dynamic roll over.]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-141.html Fri, 10 Jul 2026 13:17:40 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-141.html [Image: 1000000047.png]
This solo student pilot was practice hovering when someone parked an equipment trailer behind him. When he turned and saw it he was startled and applied lateral cyclic without sufficient altitude, caught a skid on the ground with lateral travel and experienced a dynamic rollover with resulting fire. The student pilot was able to escape with no injuries. This is also a great lesson as to why we cover the heat wrap on the exhaust with heavy aluminum foil and SS zip ties to shed spilled oil away from the red hot exhaust.]]> [Image: 1000000047.png]
This solo student pilot was practice hovering when someone parked an equipment trailer behind him. When he turned and saw it he was startled and applied lateral cyclic without sufficient altitude, caught a skid on the ground with lateral travel and experienced a dynamic rollover with resulting fire. The student pilot was able to escape with no injuries. This is also a great lesson as to why we cover the heat wrap on the exhaust with heavy aluminum foil and SS zip ties to shed spilled oil away from the red hot exhaust.]]> <![CDATA[Flying with the 30mm secondary]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-139.html Thu, 09 Jul 2026 11:19:26 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-139.html [Image: IMG-4744.jpg]]]> [Image: IMG-4744.jpg]]]> <![CDATA[Autorotation into the trees.]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-137.html Wed, 08 Jul 2026 17:30:17 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-137.html
On the flight home he elected to take a short cut over a densely wooded area instead of flying around it as I had instructed. When the helicopter was about midway over the forest he heard a bang, felt a mechanical slap on the helicopter structure, and knew to immediately enter an autorotation. The problem is that he placed himself in an area where there was no good place to land. Jim kept his cool and flared into the top of the 75’ oak trees.

The helicopter settled into the tree tops and when the main rotors contacted the oak branches the helicopter inverted and tumbled to the ground. Jim and Mia his wife were securely strapped into the helicopter as it plummeted down through the trees inverted. A limb came through the upper windshield and through Jim’s thigh impaling him in the cabin where he could not move. The fuel pump inertia switches did their job and shut the fuel pumps off killing the engine so there was no fire.

Mia was able to crawl out of the wreckage and had to hike to a spot to get cell coverage. Once connected she called 911 and shortly the emergency crews began the process of extricating Jim. While in the hospital Jim called me and told me that his concern over his perfect paint job cost him his helicopter. He also told me that he should have followed my instruction to not fly over areas that you don’t want to land in.

Upon inspection we found the middle tail rotor belt had broken due to running it too loose. It would be exceptionally rare for a properly tensioned belt to break. Always check your belt tensions prior to flying your helicopter. The tail rotor belt tensions can change with temperature, especially with a dark panted tail boom.
[Image: IMG-4672.jpg]]]>
On the flight home he elected to take a short cut over a densely wooded area instead of flying around it as I had instructed. When the helicopter was about midway over the forest he heard a bang, felt a mechanical slap on the helicopter structure, and knew to immediately enter an autorotation. The problem is that he placed himself in an area where there was no good place to land. Jim kept his cool and flared into the top of the 75’ oak trees.

The helicopter settled into the tree tops and when the main rotors contacted the oak branches the helicopter inverted and tumbled to the ground. Jim and Mia his wife were securely strapped into the helicopter as it plummeted down through the trees inverted. A limb came through the upper windshield and through Jim’s thigh impaling him in the cabin where he could not move. The fuel pump inertia switches did their job and shut the fuel pumps off killing the engine so there was no fire.

Mia was able to crawl out of the wreckage and had to hike to a spot to get cell coverage. Once connected she called 911 and shortly the emergency crews began the process of extricating Jim. While in the hospital Jim called me and told me that his concern over his perfect paint job cost him his helicopter. He also told me that he should have followed my instruction to not fly over areas that you don’t want to land in.

Upon inspection we found the middle tail rotor belt had broken due to running it too loose. It would be exceptionally rare for a properly tensioned belt to break. Always check your belt tensions prior to flying your helicopter. The tail rotor belt tensions can change with temperature, especially with a dark panted tail boom.
[Image: IMG-4672.jpg]]]> <![CDATA[Sudden engine stoppage]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-124.html Fri, 03 Jul 2026 06:33:18 -0500 Orv Neisingh]]> https://rotorwayforums.com/thread-124.html
Next I asked my 230# buddy to be my ballast weight to see how it flew with full fuel and at gross weight. As we brought the engine up to full RPM all was running smoothly, then I added collective and when we reached around 26" of MP the engine had a slight miss, it was no longer running perfectly smooth. I elected to keep it at that power setting to allow the SEA FOAM that I had added to the fuel to clean the injectors before we picked up. We ran at that power setting for about 3 minutes when all of a sudden the engine seized immediately. I was very happy that when this happened we were still firmly on the ground and there was no damage to the helicopter. Had it been at altitude then you never know how the auto will actually turn out. 

On Inspection once the engine cooled down I was able to rotate it about 15 degrees in either direction with a hard stop at each end. It appears that this engine was another one of those stock Rotorway engines that have experienced a broken crankshaft. The factory did not line bore the main bearing journals all the way through, they went from one end to the center then bored from the other end to the center often causing the journals to be out of line by several thousands of an inch. When the case is torqued around the new crankshaft that shaft is slightly bent and runs that way until if finally breaks at its weak point. Joe Huff has seen a number of these breaks as I have as well. The only solution is to install a properly designed crank as Joe does when he does his engine conversion on the reworked case that has been perfectly line bored by Joe. One of my own ships had a catastrophic engine failure at around 200 hours so I had Joe Huff build a great engine for me. 

So we have a complete A600 Talon with an engine core that either needs a replacement engine or have this one sent to Joe Huff for a complete conversion to the 172 engine. The owner does not want to put any more money into the helicopter so it would be a great buy for someone who wants to get a Talon with the Joe Huff engine conversion. 

If you are flying with a stock Rotorway engine you may have a well aligned crankshaft or you may have one that is fatiguing with each hour of flight. I now have three helicopters in my hangar that have experienced this catastrophic engine failure, two while at altitude and this on on the ground. Two are flying now thanks to Joe Huff, the third will be flying again for a new owner who wants to upgrade.
(07-03-2026, 11:33 AM)Orv Neisingh Wrote: [Image: 1000000338-1.jpg]
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Next I asked my 230# buddy to be my ballast weight to see how it flew with full fuel and at gross weight. As we brought the engine up to full RPM all was running smoothly, then I added collective and when we reached around 26" of MP the engine had a slight miss, it was no longer running perfectly smooth. I elected to keep it at that power setting to allow the SEA FOAM that I had added to the fuel to clean the injectors before we picked up. We ran at that power setting for about 3 minutes when all of a sudden the engine seized immediately. I was very happy that when this happened we were still firmly on the ground and there was no damage to the helicopter. Had it been at altitude then you never know how the auto will actually turn out. 

On Inspection once the engine cooled down I was able to rotate it about 15 degrees in either direction with a hard stop at each end. It appears that this engine was another one of those stock Rotorway engines that have experienced a broken crankshaft. The factory did not line bore the main bearing journals all the way through, they went from one end to the center then bored from the other end to the center often causing the journals to be out of line by several thousands of an inch. When the case is torqued around the new crankshaft that shaft is slightly bent and runs that way until if finally breaks at its weak point. Joe Huff has seen a number of these breaks as I have as well. The only solution is to install a properly designed crank as Joe does when he does his engine conversion on the reworked case that has been perfectly line bored by Joe. One of my own ships had a catastrophic engine failure at around 200 hours so I had Joe Huff build a great engine for me. 

So we have a complete A600 Talon with an engine core that either needs a replacement engine or have this one sent to Joe Huff for a complete conversion to the 172 engine. The owner does not want to put any more money into the helicopter so it would be a great buy for someone who wants to get a Talon with the Joe Huff engine conversion. 

If you are flying with a stock Rotorway engine you may have a well aligned crankshaft or you may have one that is fatiguing with each hour of flight. I now have three helicopters in my hangar that have experienced this catastrophic engine failure, two while at altitude and this on on the ground. Two are flying now thanks to Joe Huff, the third will be flying again for a new owner who wants to upgrade.
(07-03-2026, 11:33 AM)Orv Neisingh Wrote: [Image: 1000000338-1.jpg]
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